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Congress to prevent state interference with constitutional rights, not 
to restrict the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1. 
Keynes and Miller submit that under section 5 Congress can 
only expand, never contract, fourteenth amendment rights. They 
repeatedly cite Justice Brennan's suggestion to that effect for the 
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan.t6 They neglect to note, however, 
that Brennan's Katzenbach suggestion was only a dictum.•' (Miller 
simply acknowledges in a footnote: "Some antibusing proponents 
have questioned the binding authority of this limitation.") Why do 
the authors treat dicta that favor the Court as binding, while dis-
missing dicta that favor Congress? Here again, the inconsistency 
tends to favor the side of the Supreme Court in the debate over the 
Congress-Supreme Court power relationship. 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Jeremy Wal-
dron.• New York: Oxford University Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 
469. $59.00. 
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. 2 
Some years ago, when there was a plan in the works for tearing 
down a nice old church and replacing it with one of the undist-
inguished structures, part barn and part motel, that were the main-
stay of ecclesiastical architecture at the time, I got together with a 
colleague from the Architecture School to try to put a Historic 
Preservation Ordinance through our City Council. At the time, the 
vicissitudes of local politics had put a Republican in the mayor's 
office and a majority of Republicans on the Council-something 
that had not happened before in my time, and was not to happen 
again. Our ordinance was working its way through the legislative 
process, slowed mainly by the natural mefiance between politicians 
and academics, when the mayor took a good look at it and decided 
that it interfered with rights of property. That was the end of it. 
The conservatism prevailing in city government at the time was not 
for conserving buildings, but for conserving property rights. The 
church came down and was replaced according to plan. 
It is with the right that so concerned the city fathers that Pro-
fessor Jeremy Waldron deals in this lucid and authoritative book. 
16. 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n.IO (1966). 
17. Rossum, supra note 8, at 32. 
I. Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
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What is property? What is a right? What arguments have been 
offered for connecting one with the other, and how persuasive are 
they? Waldron answers each question carefully, with full attention 
to the complexity of the subject and the need for a nuanced ap-
proach. In the process, he digests an enormous amount of litera-
ture, giving credit where credit is due, criticizing what needs to be 
criticized, and at the same time maintaining full control of his sub-
ject and his own opinions regarding it. 
His definition of property is in terms of will. An object belongs 
to you if you are the one who gets to decide which of the things that 
may lawfully be done with objects of that kind is to be done with 
that particular object. By stating the definition in terms of what 
may be lawfully done, he effectively disarms the various polemicists 
(including the mayor with whom I began this review) who equate 
the right of property with the absence of social restraints on its 
exercise. 
I have some misgivings about defining property in this way. It 
seems to me that the question of what is to be done with a dentist's 
chair, a set of golf clubs, or the back volumes of the Indiana Re-
ports is less important than the question of who is to do it. The 
difference between the two questions played a large part in the tran-
sition from medieval to modern land law. In a medieval village, 
whether a strip of land belonged to Hodge the cotter or to the local 
squire, or to the vicar, everyone knew when it was to be plowed, 
what was to be planted in it, when the grain was to be cut, and 
when the cattle were to be let in to eat the stubble. You took re-
sponsibility for your own land in that if you worked it well you got 
a better harvest, but that was as much power of decision as you had. 
The redistribution of land under the Enclosure Acts had for its pur-
pose putting the fields into the hands of people who could decide 
what to do with them-shifting from grain to sheep in the fifteenth 
century, introducing new crops and new forms of tillage in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth. But nobody thought of this process as 
the adoption of a system of private property to replace a different 
system formerly in effect. 
I am not sure what effect his limited definition of private prop-
erty has on the general tenor of Professor Waldron's argument. 
Not a lot, as far as I can see. However, as I shall indicate later, 
there are a couple of approaches to the subject that he leaves pretty 
well out of account: I believe his definition has made it easier for 
him to do so. 
His definition of a right need not detain us. It would take an-
other (and I suspect a less useful) book to do full justice to the ques-
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tion. Waldron's main concern is to limit his already ambitious 
undertaking by excluding utilitarian arguments from consideration. 
To say that a person has a right is to say that that person has a 
claim that is morally compelling independent of any advantage that 
may accrue to other people from recognizing it. It is with claims of 
this kind that Waldron means to deal in the rest of the book. 
He divides them into two categories, which he calls special 
right based arguments (SR) and general right based arguments 
(GR). SR arguments are to the effect that some particular action, 
some particular form of appropriation, gives a person a morally 
compelling claim to a particular piece of property, a particular 
share of the original common store. Under most SR arguments, 
that claim passes on to heirs, successors, and transferees, so that 
people who now own property have as morally compelling a claim 
as did the people who first appropriated it. GR arguments are to 
the effect that everyone should have some private property (or at 
least a good chance to come by some) because people cannot lead a 
fully human existence without something to call their own. 
Waldron examines two SR arguments in detail, Locke's and 
Nozick's. But his enterprise is philosophical, not historical. He 
uses his authors and the literature they have generated as starting 
points for the best case he can make for the rights under discussion. 
Where he finds a gap in an author's argument, he does not hesitate 
to fill it in with arguments of his own. 
Having made the best case he can for SR, he finds it is not good 
enough. Being the first person to grow a crop in a field does not 
give me an obvious moral claim to spend the next growing season 
on the Riviera while somebody else works the field for subsistence 
wages and turns over the profit to me. Nor does any obvious moral 
intuition support passing any claim I have to my layabout grandson 
or to the person who beats me in a crap game. Waldron takes up all 
the proffered intuitions, works them through, and argues persua-
sively for rejecting all of them. 
The main GR argument he uses is Hegel's, though here too he 
fills in the gaps with his own thought. The argument is basically 
that to. be fully developed as a human being one needs to take 
responsibility for some part of the material universe, and that one 
takes responsibility for something by making decisions concerning 
it. It follows that everyone needs something to make decisions 
about-according to Waldron's definition of property, needs 
property. 
This intuition about human fulfillment is one that Waldron 
finds appealing-as do I. The main objection to it is that it takes 
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only one bad poker game or a few shares of worthless stock and 
some people will end up as propertyless as the day they were born. 
To make sure that everyone has property, we will have to place 
restrictions on use and transfer that will be inconsistent with genu-
ine property rights for anyone. The possibility of being a loser is 
inherent in the power to make decisions. 
Waldron considers and rejects the view often put forth that 
Hegel's requirement for full humanity will be satisfied if everyone 
has the opportunity to acquire and retain property even though 
some fail to do so. Whatever values are promoted by the struggle to 
acquire and retain, they are not the same ones we have in mind 
when we assert that people all need something to call their own. A 
lottery ticket is not a bank account. 
On the other hand, Waldron is willing-although with some 
misgivings, it seems to me-to allow enough restrictions on the ex-
ercise of property rights to make sure that people are not done out 
of their property once they get some. It is not clear to him that 
such restrictions necessarily make the right illusory. 
By ending with a bottom line he is not quite sure of, he gives 
the book a less powerful conclusion than it deserves. But he be-
lieves that his most important contribution is not in answering the 
question private property yes or no, but in organizing and analyzing 
the arguments that can legitimately be deployed on the subject. In 
the process he shows us that private property is not a single juridi-
cal form supported by a single moral argument, but that different 
arguments support different forms. It is especially important that 
SR arguments lead to quite different legal results from GR 
arguments. 
With this distinction, he unmasks a number of specious argu-
ments that have been put forward by a few theorists, and by many 
politicians, business executives, and possessors of inherited wealth. 
We are all familiar with the arguments in question; typically, they 
run something like this: Property, like life and liberty, is a basic 
human right. Therefore to interfere with my right of property by 
keeping me from chopping down my forest (making me install 
safety devices in my factory, giving some of my land to the peasants 
... ) is to interfere with a basic human right, thus violating the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition, the Constitution, the writings of the best 
philosophers, and the Helsinki accords. Behind the rhetoric is a 
move to appropriate the intuitively attractive GR argument in such 
a way that it will rub off on intuitively weak SR based claims, or 
even on the intuitively repellent claim that if something is my prop-
erty I can do just as I damn please with it. 
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Waldron's analysis inexorably refutes this move. It shows first 
that only SR arguments are inconsistent with redistribution of 
wealth. GR arguments tend to support redistribution. If everyone 
needs some property, it seems clearly appropriate to take some 
away from those who have more than they need and give it to those 
who have none at all. To resist redistribution, you must show that 
some primordial appropriation created and some system of transfer 
passed on to you rights in your particular holdings superior not 
only to the world in general but even to neighbors in serious need. 
It is not an easy task, and I believe Waldron has succeeded in show-
ing that it is impossible, at least if one excludes utilitarian 
arguments. 
The argument against interfering with the use of property by 
the owners is refuted a little differently, but just as inexorably. 
While Waldron believes, as I do, that such restrictions can be 
adopted without making the right illusory, he points out that if he is 
mistaken it is not the restrictions that must be abandoned, but the 
right itself. If we cannot secure property to everyone without im-
posing restrictions inconsistent with the nature of property, then the 
argument for universal ownership, the basic GR argument, is self-
contradictory and cannot be maintained. 
Although, as Waldron shows, the arguments for private prop-
erty cannot carry the freight they are often given to carry, they are 
not entirely wrong. There is in fact some moral claim arising from 
prior appropriation: if I am lucky enough to find a plank in a ship-
wreck, I do not think anyone can rightly take it away from me. In 
the early history of our country, there were people who bought land 
grants from state or colonial governments and used them to dis-
place pioneer settlers. Whatever their legal status, those people 
were considered morally reprehensible.J There is certainly a moral 
claim also for each person to have some space and some objects on 
which to impress his or her personality, and some place in which to 
admit intimates, exclude strangers, and on occasion, to be alone. 
We may not need the legal title, but we need the things and the 
space. 
Waldron suggests that even if these moral intuitions cannot 
support global systems of ownership and distribution, they can give 
3. In Johnson v. Mackintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 534 (1823), Chief Justice Marshall 
had an interesting encounter with the claims of prior appropriation. The litigation was be-
tween a person claiming land under a Crown grant and another person claiming the same 
land under a conveyance from the Indians he found in possession. Marshall held that the 
Indians had a right under natural law to continue occupying the land that they had been 
occupying, but that they could not convey that right to English or American settlers except in 
accordance with English or American positive law. 
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some guidance as to how we wish to move from the point at which 
we find ourselves. This seems sound. I would think, for instance, 
that the persistent tendency to respect prior appropriation and to 
leave people in possession of what is theirs would suggest caution in 
committing ourselves to a system of permanent institutionalized re-
distribution such as Roberto Unger seems to suggest.4 Also, the 
idea that property is necessary for full human development might 
lead us to prefer humane use of property to speculative or generic 
uses.s Preservation of the family farm is an example of what I have 
in mind. Simone Weil develops a similar idea in The Need for 
Roots, where she points out the danger of allocating ownership and 
use in such a way that a given resource satisfies no one's need for 
property. She argues that this is true, for example, of a field that 
belongs to an absentee landlord and is worked by subsistence labor-
ers. It does not satisfy the laborers' need because they have no stake 
in it, and it does not satisfy the landlord's need because he never 
sees it. 6 Her argument could be usefully applied to a number of the 
manifestations of entrepreneurship that we read about in the papers 
these days. 
It should be apparent from what I have said that Waldron has 
covered a vast amount of ground in this book. For that very reason, 
I think a caveat needs to be entered: he has not covered the entire 
field. There are other approaches to the subject and other kinds of 
light to be shed on it besides those contained in the great body of 
material he organizes, digests, criticizes, and builds on so well. A 
leading example is the Marxist approach, which emphasizes that 
different classes have different forms of appropriation, and therefore 
different forms of property. With this approach, we can see there-
lations between landholding and the performance of services as a 
form of property characteristic of the feudal landholding class, 
while the forms of property dealt with in Waldron's book are those 
characteristic of the bourgeoisie. Expense accounts, executive 
suites, and company cars would then be, as Milovan Djilas says, the 
form of property characteristic of the "new class," the managerial 
elite. Waldron touches on Marxist doctrine only briefly, and on the 
relation between class and property not at all. I believe his views on 
both would have been interesting. 
I would also have liked to see him take some account of the 
recent papal encyclicals and the venerable and sophisticated tradi-
4. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 32-36, 52-56 and passim 
(1986). 
5. SeeR. RODES, LAW AND LIBERATION 74-77 (1986). 
6. S. WEIL, THE NEED FOR ROOTS 35 (1952). 
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tion behind them. Rereading John XXIII'S Mater et Magistra (Par. 
104-121) in the light of Waldron's work, I find a nicely nuanced 
discussion of the need for property as a means of appropriating 
one's own labor (SR) and as a prerequisite to responsible action in 
the world (GR). Political developments in recent years have given 
new importance to this document and to the body of doctrine of 
which it forms a part. This material is rooted in classical and medi-
eval natural law traditions, and in Christian and Jewish religious 
traditions stretching back to the passage from Leviticus (c. 25) re-
quiring buyers of land to give it back in the jubilee year. Waldron, 
who deals with neither natural law nor theology except as Locke 
appeals to them, could have found considerable support in them for 
some of the positions he finds most attractive. 
But it is not fair to ask that a work so broad in scope should be 
broader still. It is only because Waldron has handled so well the 
material he set out to handle that I wish he had handled more. 
There is in fact no need for him to do so. A book like this is in-
tended to be the beginning, not the end, of thinking about the sub-
ject it covers. Waldron has provided insights that can be used in 
analyzing any theory of private property, whether he has taken it up 
or not. 
HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICf 
COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFI· 
CIALS. By Philip J. Cooper.• New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press. 1988. Pp. 374. $16.95, paper. 
Richard B. Collins 2 
The title of this book suggests an attempt at new enlightenment 
on the dilemma of the hard case. But Professor Philip Cooper's 
introduction disclaims any purpose to "sit in judgment on the 
judges by declaring whether they should or should not have issued 
the orders in question" (civil rights injunctions). His more modest 
goal is to present "a rather different view of the judicial process, one 
that . . . provides a better understanding of the interactions of fed-
eral courts and state and local officials." This is to be descriptive 
and analytical, not prescriptive, except for some "suggestions re-
garding the ways in which administrators and judges can improve 
their relationships." Hard choices are the milieu, not the problem. 
I. Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
